

# A pain in the AES

Is LPWAN security doomed to be tedious ?

Nicolas MOREL

Supervisors: Stéphane DELBRUEL, Dave Singelée,



LPWAN days - 08/07/2024

KU LEUVEN

BORDEAUX  
INP


LaBRI

# Context


- A need to ensure security for the whole stack (Physical ↔ Applicative)
- Current security solutions seems not satisfying enough

# LPWAN Security


- Based on a Central Authority



# LPWAN Security - Issues/Limits




# LPWAN Security - Issues/Limits



# LPWAN Security - Issues/Limits

Disconnected from the  
network



# PHYsec

**Physical Layer based Security (PHYsec)** proposes to rely on physical phenomena to provide security mechanisms

Leveraging on **Channel Reciprocity theorem** to offer new primitives :

- **Key Generation from unauthenticated channel** using channel features as common entropy source
- **Physical Authentication (RF Fingerprinting)** based on non-reproducible channel features

# PHYsec – Channel Reciprocity Theorem


- **Noise** applied to the channel is **static** during  $T_c$

Channels estimates :

$$H_a = h_a + \epsilon$$


$$H_b = h_b + \epsilon$$

- A & B share a common random source 'e'






# PHYsec – Principles




$$I(AB, BA) = \epsilon$$



$$I(AE, BE) = \epsilon'$$



# PHYsec - Key Generation Procedure



# PHYsec - Key Generation Procedure



# PHYsec – Acquisition & Challenges


$$H_a = h_a + \epsilon_x$$

$$H_b = h_b + \epsilon_x + \epsilon_{x+1}$$


$\Delta(\textit{Physical})$

- Hardware impairments
- Half-Duplex

## Half-Duplex Problem



# PHYsec - Key Generation Procedure



$$\Delta = \Delta_{\text{Physical}} +$$


# PHYsec – Quantization & Challenges



- different methods (Compressed Sensing, level-crossing)

- some methods choose quantization parameters without communicating


## Quantization sequence diagram



$\Delta(\text{Method})$

- key shift (mismatch)

# PHYsec - Key Generation Procedure




$$\Delta = \Delta_{\text{Physical}} + \Delta_{\text{Method}}$$

# PHYsec – Reconciliation & Challenges

- FE can reproduce the secret (K\_RNG) if K\_quant\_a and K\_quant\_b are similar

- correcting 20% err on 128 bits key  
=> 789590193573 helpers

## Fuzzy Extractors based reconciliation



*C(Time)*


- Comms: Sending wide vectors, a lot of times, longer keygen



# PHYsec – Reconciliation & Challenges

## Compressed Sensing based reconciliation


- **L1-optimization** is not implemented for low power devices



*C(Time)*

- Computation: recovering  $(K_b - K_a)$  is difficult


# PHYsec - Key Generation Procedure




$$\Delta = \Delta_{\text{Physical}} + \Delta_{\text{Method}}$$

# PHYsec – Privacy Amplification

- Distillate Eve knowledge of the  $K_{rec}$  key



# PHYsec - Key Generation Procedure



# Conclusion / Perspectives

- PHYsec could improve LPWAN security (resilience, privacy, device-to-device)
- Research challenges
  - address issues before reconciliation
  - energy efficiency

**We're hiring !**

Open positions (a lot) : PhDs, Postdocs, engineers !

Send mail [stephane.delbruel@labri.fr](mailto:stephane.delbruel@labri.fr)